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NOTE
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: Defining the Right
to Engage in Anonymous Political Speech

In for a calf is not always in for a cow... We do not.., hold
that the State may not in other, larger circumstances, require the
speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity.1
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Commission2 provides the latest word on the extent
to which the First Amendment protects anonymous political speech.'
The decision struck down as unconstitutional an Ohio statute that
required the disclosure of one's identity when distributing electionrelated pamphlets.4 In reaching this decision, the majority applied its
traditional "exacting scrutiny" test to Ohio's proscription of
anonymous speech, while the dissent applied a somewhat reformulated test. Both opinions, nonetheless, employed essentially the
same balancing analysis. Despite balancing the same interests,
however, the Court split sharply on the appropriate result.5
1. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring) (responding to Justice Scalia's dissent).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
3. The First Amendment affords broad protection to political expression to assure
the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Through the
vehicle of the press, "people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to
intelligent self-government ...enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the
political process ...[thereby] effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment."
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974). In times of turmoil,
the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of
free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). And particularly "in a republic where the
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam).
4. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1524.
5. Compare id. at 1524 (finding that anonymous political speech is "an honorable
tradition of advocacy and of dissent" and that Ohio's statute is unconstitutional because
it indiscriminately outlaws such speech "with no necessary relationship to the danger
sought to be prevented") with id. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (replying that striking
down Ohio's law "on the ground that all anonymous communication is in our society
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Moreover, the majority left the jurisprudential door slightly cracked,
suggesting the possibility that some kind of acceptable proscription on
anonymous speech exists, but gave no indication of what such a
proscription might look like.6 For these reasons, the decision's legal
analysis does not provide a satisfying exposition of the concerns truly
driving the debate, nor does it offer a satisfactory guide for predicting
how the Court will rule on future anonymous political speech
questions.
Instead of looking only at the legal arguments, therefore, a more
fruitful approach may be to look also at the normative considerations
lurking under the surface.7 When the opinion is viewed in that light,
it appears that McIntyre will prove to be dispositive regarding the
level of First Amendment protection that anonymous political speech
will ultimately enjoy. That is, normative concerns considered,
McIntyre appears to establish and define a constitutional right to
engage in leafletting and other political speech anonymously that is
founded on the role anonymity plays as a shield from tyrannical
majoritarian power. Moreover, viewed from this perspective, the
decision suggests that any state or federal proscription on one's ability
to engage in anonymous political speech, whenever anonymity is

traditionally sacrosanct, seems to me a distortion of the past that will lead to a coarsening
of the future").
6. See id. at 1522 ("We recognize that a State's enforcement interest might justify a
more limited identification requirement... ."); id. at 1524 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("We
do not.., hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker
to disclose its ... identity.").
7. This Note presents a normative assessment of the Court's McIntyre decision,
positing several questions that help to define the Court's apparent normative beliefs
regarding the role that anonymous political speech plays in our society. These questions
are then used to construct a model of the Court's decision-making calculus regarding
anonymity that is both descriptive, in that it helps to articulate the compelling concerns
underlying the Court's decisions in McIntyre and other related case law, and predictive,
in that it provides a framework with which to make reasonable predictions regarding the
outcome of future decisions on anonymous political speech questions. The assessment
presented in this Note is not critically normative; it does not critique whether the Court
ought to have ruled the way that it did in McIntyre. Also, the normative assessment
applied here differs from a more traditional, rule-oriented legal analysis. As discussed
infra notes 75-109 and accompanying text, such a traditional legal analysis does not appear
to offer as powerful an explanation of the Court's reasoning in McIntyre as a normative
analysis, especially when considering Justice Scalia's dissent.
For another commentary that attempts to draw a larger unifying theme of Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding the "balance between an individual's right to free speech
and the community's right to be free of a cacophony of unrestrained voices," based on an
assessment of the Court's recent decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994),
see Alan Howard, City of Ladue v. Gilleo: Content Discrimination and the Right to
Participatein Public Debate, 14 ST. Louis U. L.J. 349, 352-53 (1995).
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necessary as a check against coercion and reprisal, will be struck down
as unconstitutional!
This Note first summarizes the facts behind McIntyre and the
analyses used in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions of
the Court.' It then reviews two distinct lines of foundational case law
underlying McIntyre and the McIntyre Court's treatment of those
cases, 10 and more thoroughly assesses the legal analyses used by the
majority and dissent in the case." The Note then discusses why
these analytical approaches do not serve well as predictive models for
anticipating how the Court will decide future anonymous political
speech questions and offers as an alternative a normative approach
for considering the factors underlying the McIntyre decision."2 To
further elucidate and test this alternative approach, the Note then
demonstrates the operation of the same normative concerns in the
prior case law.'3 In conclusion, the Note uses this normative
technique to predict the Court's likely course with regard to
anonymous political speech.' 4
In 1988, Margaret McIntyre expressed her opposition to a
proposed school tax levy by handing out leaflets at several public
Acting independently, she commeetings in Westerville, Ohio.'
posed the leaflet on her home computer and had it copied by a
professional printer." Although she identified herself as the author
on some of the leaflets, and meant to include her name on all of

8. For discussions of other current conflicts between anonymous speech and
governmental interests in disclosure, see generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor
is the Key: Cryptography,the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709
(1995) (discussing Constitutional concerns regarding people's needs and abilities to keep
and selectively disclose secrets in conjunction with the state's interest in, and power to
penetrate, those secrets); Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The
Tension between Privacy and Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11
(1991) (discussing constitutional concerns for the protection of sanctuaries of private
liberty from state intervention with regard to Justice Brandeis's maxim that "[s]unlight is
...the best of disinfectants" (citation omitted)); George P. Long, III, Comment, Who Are
You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace,55 U. Pr. L. REv. 1177 (1994) (discussing
the problems and debate surrounding anonymity and the various forms of publicly
accessible electronic media-cyberspace-such as the Internet).

9. See infra notes 15-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-74 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text.

12. See infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra notes 125-62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
Id.
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the signature "CONCERNED PARENTS
them, some carried only
17
AND TAX PAYERS.'
Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently charged with a violation of
section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code for distributing anonymous
election-related leaflets.' 8 The Ohio Elections Commission fined her
$100, and was affirmed on appeal by a divided Ohio Supreme
Court. The majority distinguished McIntyre from the United States
20 which had
Supreme Court's decision in Talley v. California,
invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafletting, by
finding that the purpose of the Ohio law was to identify persons who
distribute materials containing false statements."' The Ohio Supreme
Court also found that the Ohio law was valid because the burdens it
imposed on the First Amendment rights of voters were both
"reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory," based on the "ordinary
litigation" test articulated by the Supreme Court in Anderson v.
Celebrezze.2 Under the "ordinary litigation" test, a court must
consider "the relative interests of the State and the injured voters, and
[then evaluate] the extent to which the State's interests necessitated
the contested restrictions. '
The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of seven to two in a
decision authored by Justice Stevens.24 The Court found that, while
Talley did not necessarily control,' the First Amendment protects
the freedom to publish anonymously, and that this freedom extends
to the advocacy of political causes, including both candidate elections
17. Id. At no time was Mrs. McIntyre accused of making false, misleading, or libelous

statements. Id.
18. Id. The Ohio Code provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall write, print
or distribute ... a notice ... or any other form of general publication which is
designed to... influence the voters in any election.., unless there appears on such form
... the name and residence ... of the ... person who issues, makes or is responsible
therefor." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988).
19. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ohio 1993), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 1511 (1995).

20. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Talley was of particular concern to the Ohio Supreme Court,
and justly so, because it voided a Los Angeles ordinance banning anonymous leafletting

that was somewhat broader than, but otherwise notably similar to, Ohio's statute. See
infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing Talley).
21. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154.
22. Id. at 155 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983)).
23. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
24. Id. at 1513. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment only. Justice Ginsburg
also wrote a concurring opinion. Id.
25. Id. at 1517; see infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Talley

Court's reasoning in striking down the Los Angeles prohibition of anonymous leafletting).
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and issue-based elections such as the school-tax referendum of
concern to Mrs. McIntyre.26 Repeating a phrase that has become
almost pro forma in the relevant case law, the Court noted that its
staunch protection of open discussion on governmental affairs arises
from a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."27
The Court also noted that the "ordinary litigation" test articulated in Anderson was not appropriately applied under the facts
in McIntyre.' Rather, because Ohio's ban is a regulation of core
political speech and because it applies to writings based on their
content as election-related speech, the appropriate analysis was to
determine whether the ban could survive "exacting scrutiny"; that is,
whether the proscription was narrowly tailored to serve an overriding
state interest.29
The Court acknowledged that while the prevention of fraud
might constitute an overriding state interest, Ohio had not, in fact,
adopted the statute to further that interest directly.' ° Moreover,
even if preventing fraud was the actual end of the legislation, the
Court held that the statute adopted was too broad.3 ' Finally, the
Court distinguished two decisions upon which the State had relied,
including FirstNational Bank of Boston v. BellottiP2 and Buckley v.

26. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1519.
27. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
28. Id. at 1518-19. Leaving little room for debate, the Court stated that its
"precedents ... make abundantly clear that the Ohio Supreme Court applied a
significantly more lenient standard than is appropriate for a case of this kind." Id. at 1519.
29. Id. at 1519. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 798-99
(2d ed. 1988) ("The Court applies the 'most exacting scrutiny' to regulations that
discriminate among instances of speech based on its content.") (citations omitted); infra
notes 57, 82-91 and accompanying text (discussing in more detail the exacting scrutiny
test).
Under the "exacting" or "strict" scrutiny test, the State bears the burden of showing
that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end." Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)). The Court has emphasized that "it is the rare case in which ... a law survives
strict scrutiny." Id. at 211 (plurality opinion); see also McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1535 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (commenting that application of the exacting scrutiny test is "ordinarily the
kiss of death").
30. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1519-22.
31. Id.
32. 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (commenting in dicta on the benefits of requiring
identification of the source of corporate campaign financing); see infra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text (discussing Bellotti).
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Valeo,33 because "[n]either case involved the prohibition of
anonymous campaign materials., 34 The Court then found the law
unconstitutional because it was not sufficiently tailored to meet an
overriding state interest 5
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas limited
his analysis strictly to a detailed historical review of the practice and
protection of anonymous political speech.3 6 Finding that the
"Framers understood the First Amendment to protect an author's
right to express his thoughts on political candidates or issues in an
anonymous fashion," he concluded that the majority had unnecessarily
adopted37 an analysis largely unconnected to the Constitution's text and
history.

33. 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per curiam) (approving as constitutional the required
disclosure of campaign-related expenditures); see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text
(discussing Buckley).
34. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522.
35. Id. at 1524.
The question of what
36. Id, at 1525-30 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
theoretical rationales are appropriate for justifying the modem free speech doctrine, or
proposed alternative doctrines, is the subject of considerable debate in the literature,
Professor Cass Sunstein asserts that the primary purpose of free speech is to promote
democratic deliberation on issues of public policy. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 241-52 (1993). For a critique of this assertion and
Sunstein's other arguments regarding the role of free speech in our democracy, see J.M.
Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935
(1995) (book review). For a sampling of several expositions of the traditional free speech
rationales used to critique and advance several different perspectives on the role of free
speech in our society, see David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA
L. REv. 143, 147, 200-01 (1992) (surveying four values "generally recognized as
undergirding modem free speech doctrine" in the context of arguing that several recent
Supreme Court decisions have impoverished the public forum doctrine); Stanley Ingber,
Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in
Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1, 11-20 (1990) (surveying the traditional
justifications for free speech in the context of arguing that such justifications are
unsatisfying when based on the philosophy of individualism and proffering a free speech
doctrine that considers the importance of interactions between citizens and government
in institutional settings in order to attain civic virtue); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman,
Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The
Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267, 272-83 (1991) (discussing political and free
speech theory and free speech doctrine in arguing against the evils of civic republic
philosophy and championing the "core free speech values" based on individualism).
concurring in the judgment). This
37. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1525-30 (Thomas, J.,
rather narrow approach to constitutional interpretation lies at the core of an ongoing
debate. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The OriginalUnderstandingof OriginalIntent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 902-13 (1985) (discussing early views on interpreting the
dissenting) (concluding
Constitution); see also McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1531-32 (Scalia, J.,
that, despite Justice Thomas's conclusions, an historical analysis could not be used to
determine that the Framers had intended that anonymous political speech be considered
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In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia
asserted first that "there is inadequate reason to believe [that the
imperatives of anonymous free-speech imposed by the concurrence]
were those of the society that begat the First Amendment or the
Fourteenth."38 He then described a "universal and long-established
American legislative practice" of imposing electioneering-speech
restrictions such as Ohio's, and stated that "[a] governmental practice
that has become general throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong
presumption of constitutionality."39
Stating that the "Court discovers a hitherto unknown right-to-beunknown while engaging in electoral politics,"'4 Justice Scalia
contended that the right to anonymous leafletting is not so prominent
a value as to warrant striking down Ohio's law as unconstitutional.4
He particularly emphasized that this action by an unelected judiciary
was contrary to the judgment of elected politicians-who have more
practical experience in electoral matters-in forty-nine state legislatures and the federal Congress.42 Ohio's ban on anonymous
protected free speech); TRIBE, supra note 29, at 785 n.3 ("Attempts to develop a first
amendment jurisprudence based on historical evidence regarding the intent of the framers
have proven quite manipulable.").
38. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Id, at 1532-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that the Ohio statute in
question had been enacted almost 80 years ago, that "[n]o less than 24 States had similar
laws by the end of World War I, and [that] today every State of the Union except
California has one." Id (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted). He also provided, in
two separate footnotes, citations to all of the state statutes to which he had alluded. Id.
at 1533 nn.1-2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First

Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144,144-50 (1995), for a thorough survey of different state
regulations that require some form of disclosure on political or electoral writings, and for
several suggested methods for categorizing those statutes. See also Steven Robert Daniels,
Recent Case, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1618, 1624-25 (1994) for a similar review of state statutes
and for analysis suggesting that the presumptive constitutionality of such state statutes may
not be as strong as suggested by Justice Scalia.
40. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This assertion has merit to the
extent that the Framers had not clearly debated a right to anonymity, see id.at 1525
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that "we have no record of discussions
of anonymous political expression either in the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of
Rights, or in the state ratifying conventions"), and to the extent that, prior to McIntyre,
Talley was the only Supreme Court case that came close to addressing specifically the issue
of anonymous election-related leafletting.
41. Id. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1535 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). One should note, however, that a concern with
legislative tradition was arguably not so clearly contrary to the Court's interest in securing
freedom of speech in other cases as it was in McIntyre. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 206 (1992) (plurality opinion) (noting that "all 50 states limit access to areas in or
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campaign-related speech, he concluded, should have been found
constitutional.43
Thus, the majority and dissenting opinions of McIntyre encapsulate some of the persistent arguments and theoretical differences on
First Amendment interpretation. Although technically authoritative
only on the narrow question of the freedom to express electionrelated speech anonymously, McIntyre nonetheless has potentially farreaching implications regarding the continued viability of many state
laws constraining such political speech. Before considering just how
the Court's use of those arguments and theoretical differences might
serve to predict the course of future adjudication, however, it is
helpful to consider first some of the pivotal case law underlying
McIntyre and the treatment the McIntyre Court gave that case law.
Two discernible lines of Supreme Court case law have evolved
over the past century to address freedom of speech at its intersection
with federal and state restrictions on anonymity. One line upheld
restrictions on anonymous speech, while the other struck down such
restrictions. The following discussion summarizes several of the cases
from these two divergent judicial paths, which were relied upon by
the majority, the dissent, or both in McIntyre.'

around polling places"); id. at 214-16 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (commenting
on the long-standing state tradition of banning election-day speech near polling places,
including "public forum" areas such as adjacent streets and sidewalks); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 70 n.2 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting) (stating that as of 1960, 36 states had
statutes prohibiting the anonymous distribution of materials related to elections); United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 n.16 (1954) (noting that as of 1954, over 20 states had
lobbyist disclosure requirements). But see Burson, 504 U.S. at 219-20 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that history should not be confused with necessity and used to justify
restraints on speech).
43. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Instead of characterizing the case law as two distinct lines of precedent, which
implies two different sets of rationales and policies, the body of case law might be
characterized as a single set of principles that have led to the invalidation of some state
statutes limiting free speech and the approval of others. However, in light of this Note's
discussion of the normative concerns displayed by the Court in McIntyre and other related
decisions, see infra notes 110-62 and accompanying text, a good argument can be made
that in fact the cases do in some sense represent two lines of distinct rationale.
For Supreme Court decisions that have addressed questions involving First
Amendment protections of anonymity, but that were not cited in McIntyre, see Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-801 (1988) (finding unconstitutional North
Carolina's requirement that professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors the
percentage of prior contributions actually given to charity); Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,298-99 (1981) (rejecting
city's assertion that the prophylactic measure of requiring disclosure of campaign
contributors' identities amounted to a compelling governmental interest); Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969) (finding that the controversy in question under New
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A significant early case in which the Court found a prohibition

on anonymous speech to be constitutional was Lewis Publishing Co.
v. Morgan.4' This case involved a federal disclosure requirement
imposed on newspapers seeking to take advantage of second class

postage rates.46

The Lewis Publishing Court found that such

newspapers could be required to disclose and publish the names and

addresses of editors, managers, and owners.47 Reasoning that the
disclosure requirement was incidental to a validly-exerted control on
the use of postal privileges, the Court rejected the argument that the
First Amendment prohibited the requirement of such disclosures.48
Another case upholding the required disclosure of the identities
of parties participating in the electoral-political process was Buckley
v. Valeo.49 In Buckley the Court found federal requirements that

candidates, certain political committees, and individuals making
expenditures

above

an

enumerated

threshold

disclose

their

contributions and expenditures to the Federal Election Commission
were not overbroad, but rather served substantial interests by
informing the electorate and preventing the corruption of the political
process.5 °

York's statute prohibiting anonymous handbills lacked requisite immediacy and reality to
warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment); Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88-105 (1961) (finding the registration
requirements of a federal act addressing subversive groups, as applied, did not constitute
a restraint on freedom of expression and association in violation of the First Amendment).
45. 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
46. Id. at 296.
47. Id. at 299.
48. Id. at 314-16. Although arguably more an issue of freedom of the press, this
decision was raised by Justice Scalia in his dissent to argue that the Court had long ago
rejected "a generalized right of anonymity in speech." McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1535 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also commented that this postal regulation, which is still in
effect, might be just "one of several federal laws seemingly invalidated by [McIntyre]." Id.

(Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The State of Ohio relied heavily on Buckley as
precedent to argue for the validity of its ban on anonymous election speech. McIntyre, 115

S. Ct. at 1523-24.
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-67. Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the very
low expenditure threshold for individuals was too great a burden. Id. at 236-37 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). He concluded that Congress, failing to confine its exercise of
governmental power within reasonable limits under the First Amendment, had "used a
shotgun to kill wrens as well as hawks." Id. at 238-39 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
The McIntyre Court held that Buckley did not control, however, because it involved
only the receipt and expenditure of money for the purpose of influencing candidates or
elected officials, rather than the anonymous distribution of issue-based electoral
publications. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522-24. In distinguishing Buckley, the Court noted
in a footnote that the same reasoning also served to distinguish McIntyre from its earlier
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A more recent decision upholding a restraint on campaign-related
speech, Burson v. Freeman,5 ' was handed down in 1992. This case
addressed a Tennessee statute prohibiting all campaign-related
materials-anonymous or not-within 100 feet of a polling place
entrance on election day 2 Although amounting to a "facially
content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum," 3 the
Burson Court found it to be a reasonably tailored regulation,
appropriately designed to achieve the state's interest in providing a
voting environment free from intimidation and fraud.54

decision in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1523 n.20.
Harrissconsidered a federal act requiring that for-hire lobbyists disclose their identities
when they are paid to influence proposed or pending legislation by direct communication
with members of Congress. Harriss,347 U.S. at 623. The Harriss Court noted that this
restriction was enacted to prevent the voices of the people from being "drowned out by
the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal," id.at 625, and that any deterrent to the exercise of First
Amendment rights would be minimal, at most indirect, and too remote to strike down the
otherwise valid statute, id. at 626.
The Court went to some length to distinguish McIntyre from these two cases and
Bellotti, see infranotes 58-62 and accompanying text, because Ohio had vigorously argued
that propositions supported by these cases, including specifically that disclosure
requirements can have the "prophylactic effect" of exposing and discouraging campaign
corruption, amply supported the constitutionality of its disclosure requirements.
51. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion). This decision provides an interesting
contrast to McIntyre because while six Justices heard both cases-Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter-the McIntyre decision
upheld a state restriction on speech, while the Burson decision struck down such a
restriction. Only Justice Kennedy sat with the majority in both decisions, and in Burson
he filed a concurring opinion to voice his reservations with the majority's analysis and to
assert his belief that Tennessee's restrictions at the polling place did not amount to a
suppression of legitimate expression in the first place. Id. at 211-14 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In contrast, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist found both
Tennessee's and Ohio's restrictions to be constitutional, siding with the majority in Burson,
id. at 211, 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), and dissenting in McIntyre, 115 S.Ct.
at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter found
both regulations unconstitutional, with the majority in McIntyre, L at 1524, and dissenting
in Burson, 504 U.S. at 228 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-11(b) (Supp. 1991); Burson, 504 U.S. at 193-94 (plurality
opinion).
53. Burson, 504 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion).
54. ld. at 211 (plurality opinion). The McIntyre Court referred to Burson only to
note that the same "exacting scrutiny" test had been applied in both cases, as required
when a law burdens core political speech, see supra note 29 and accompanying text
(discussing the "exacting scrutiny" test), and to note that Tennessee's regulation was distinguishable from Ohio's in that the former was suitably limited, applying only within a 100foot perimeter on election day. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1522 n.16. Justice Scalia in his
dissent, however, pointed to Burson several times to support his argument that tradition
should govern when considering the constitutionality of election-related issues of free
speech "at the periphery of the First Amendment," and that Ohio's regulation should have
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In contrast to this line of decisions allowing proscriptions on
anonymity is a second line, relied upon by the majority in McIntyre,
which supports the proposition that anonymous election-related
speech is soundly within First Amendment protection. Lovell v.
Griffin"5 is an example of an early case providing such protection.
The Lovell Court held unconstitutional a municipal ordinance
requiring any person distributing literature of any kind-anonymous
or not-to obtain prior permission from the city manager.5 6 Such a
requirement, stated the Court, "strikes at the very foundation of the
freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship."5 7
A more recent decision providing some theoretical grounding for
McIntyre was First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, decided in

been found constitutional. Id. at 1531-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
56. Id. at 450-51.

57. it at 451. The decision established that the liberty of the "press" is not confined
to newspapers and periodicals, but embraces pamphlets and leaflets as well. Id. at 452.
The McIntyre Court referred to Lovell and to InternationalSoc'y for Krishna Conscious-

ness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), in declaring that "the speech in which Mrs. McIntyre
engaged-handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint-is
the essence of First Amendment expression." McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519.
Like Lovell, the case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
decided some 20 years later, helped to blaze the trail that the Court followed in McIntyre.
The Patterson decision held that an Alabama law requiring the NAACP to disclose its
rank-and-file membership was an unconstitutional infringement on First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id. at 466 (adjudging ALA. CODE §§ 192-98 (1940)). Patterson is
comparable to McIntyre to the extent that it involved a state mandatory disclosure law
held unconstitutional as overbroad. Id. In fact, since Patterson the Court has required
that a state restriction burdening some core constitutional right survive the "exacting
scrutiny" test, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam), such that the law in
question will be upheld as constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the
"exacting scrutiny" test). Unlike McIntyre, however, Pattersonaddressed members' rights
of association threatened by the potential publication of the NAACP's membership roster,
rather than the right of free speech. Although a foundational decision underlying
McIntyre, and referred to as elemental in much of the case law discussed in this Note, the
majority in McIntyre did not refer to Patterson. Perhaps the majority chose not to rely on
Pattersonbecause that case does not speak directly to the issue of anonymous free speech.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, pointed to Patterson,as well as to Brown v. Socialist
Workers, 459 U.S. 87 (1982), and Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), in
asserting that the Court has never acknowledged a general right to anonymity, but rather
has recognized "a right to an exemption from otherwise valid disclosure requirements on
the part of someone who could show a 'reasonable probability' that the compelled
disclosure would result in 'threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government
officials or private parties.'" McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. 1534-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
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1978.58 The Bellotti Court found unconstitutional a Massachusetts
law that prohibited corporate expenditures designed to influence
referenda not related to a
income tax referenda or, more generally,
59
given company's corporate interests.
Relevant here are several aspects of Bellotti discussed by the
McIntyre Court. First, the Court referred to Bellotti to note that
"speech on [an] income-tax referendum 'is at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection.' "60 The McIntyre Court also used Bellotti
to assert that the risk of corruption inherent with candidate elections
C'simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.' ,61
Finally, in response to the Ohio Supreme Court's reliance upon
Bellotti to support its decision, the United States Supreme Court held
in McIntyre that Bellotti in fact did not control and that the
"prophylactic" effects of disclosure requirements as discussed in both
Bellotti and Buckley did not amount to an overriding state interest
sufficient to allow the prohibition of anonymous electioneering

speech.62
The case most clearly addressing a right to anonymity in the
context of state regulation of speech is Talley v. Californiaf In
Talley, the Court found unconstitutional a Los Angeles ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of any handbill, in any place under any
circumstance, that failed to identify the name and address of the

58. 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); see McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522. Bellotti amplified the
scope of the First Amendment in terms of the identity of the speaker protected. This
decision established that for some First Amendment protections of free speech,
corporations are people, too.
Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in McIntyre, also joined the majority
in Bellotti. Both decisions recognized great weight and breadth in the First Amendment's
protection of free speech. At the same time, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined the
dissent in McIntyre, also dissented in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
essentially finding in Bellotti that corporations as creatures of state law should be subject
to state restrictions on speech and enjoy less First Amendment protection.
In any event, the Bellotti Court made it clear that it was not "deciding whether the
First Amendment's protection of corporate speech is coextensive with the protection
[afforded] to individuals." McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522 (discussing Bellotti).
59. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767 (adjudging MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West
Supp. 1977)).
60. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
61. Id. at 1521 n.15 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790).
62. Id. at 1522-24. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing Buckley
and Ohio's reliance on that decision).
63. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). For an analysis of the Court's jurisprudence regarding the
constitutional protection of anonymity generally, written in 1961 shortly after the Talley
decision was handed down, see Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity: Free
Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961).
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author.64 The unsigned handbills at issue in Talley urged the boycott
of certain Los Angeles merchants allegedly engaged in discriminatory
employment practices.'
The State defended the ordinance as
necessary to provide "a way to identify those responsible for fraud,
false advertising and libel., 66 As in McIntyre, however, nothing in
the language of the regulation or the legislative history indicated such
a purpose, nor limited the regulation's application to such a purpose.67 Noting that "[t]here can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute
information and thereby freedom of expression,"' 6 the Talley Court
found that the ordinance fell "precisely" under the ban on state
prohibitions of speech as articulated in Lovell69 and "that it, like the
Griffin, Georgia, ordinance, [was] void on its face."7 °
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the relevance of Talley and
specifically distinguished that decision in its disposition of McIntyre.7
The United States Supreme Court in McIntyre also conceded that
Talley did not necessarily control the disposition of its decision
because the Los Angeles ordinance extended to all forms of handbills,
not just to election-related materials.72 Nonetheless, the Court found
that its reasoning in Talley "embraced a respected tradition of
anonymity in the advocacy of political causes."'
The McIntyre
Court then used essentially the same reasoning as applied in Talley to
conclude that Ohio's ban on anonymous election-related speech was
not sufficiently tailored to meet an overriding state interest.74

64. Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61 (adjudging LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE

§ 28.06).
65. Id. at 61.

66. Id. at 64.
67. Id.; McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517. The McIntyre Court also noted that it had "made
clear [in Talley] that [it] did 'not pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent
these or any other supposed evils.' " Id. (quoting Talley, 362 U.S. at 64).
68. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
69. Id. at 63, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (describing the Lovell
decision).
70. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
71. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ohio 1993), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
72. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517.

73. Id. (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 1517-22, see infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text (discussing the
McIntyre Court's reasoning in finding Ohio's statute overly broad).
For more discussion of federal and state disclosure requirements imposed on political
campaign literature, see FRANKLIN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY
354-58 (1981).
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Given this sampling of the case law underlying the McIntyre
Court's decision, it is helpful to consider more closely the fundamental legal arguments used in the majority and dissenting opinions to
discern the rationales behind those two opinions. Justice Stevens, in
his majority opinion, did not follow a clearly delineated approach in
reaching the decision to strike down Ohio's ban on anonymous
political speech. In order to understand the analytical process used
by the majority, however, and to better compare that process to the
analysis employed by Justice Scalia in his dissent, it is helpful to
consider each opinion's analytical framework in a step-by-step fashion.
As a first step, the McIntyre majority considered whether Ohio's
statute somehow limited election-related speech, or merely controlled
the mechanics of the electoral process itself, such as by setting filing
deadlines, limiting ballot access, or prescribing a write-in voting
process.' As a rule, if only the mechanics are regulated, then the
"ordinary litigation" test applies, which asks only whether the State's
interests necessitate the contested restrictions and whether those
restrictions place more than a "reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory"
burden on the rights of the voters.76 Because it found that the
statute amounted to a regulation of "pure speech" and involved " 'a
limitation on political expression,' " the Court concluded that the
statute was not an " 'ordinary election restriction' " and that the
"ordinary litigation" test did not apply."
While addressing whether Ohio's statute was more than a mere
regulation of the electoral process, the Court also considered whether
the statute abridged a form of speech protected under the First
Amendment.7" When making this determination, the Court generally considers whether the statute in question, although possibly not a
complete prohibition on speech, nonetheless amounts to a "regulation
of political speech, [a] regulation of speech in a public forum, [or a]
regulation based on the content of the speech."79 In McIntyre the
75. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518.

76. Id The State of Ohio argued unsuccessfully that its ban on anonymous election
literature fell within the purview of "reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory" regulations
designed to ensure fair and honest elections, based on its reading of the applicability of
the "ordinary litigation" test as articulated in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Ohio court's use of the
ordinary litigation test).
77. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
78. Il at 1518.
79. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,196 (1992) (plurality opinion). Others argue that
this assessment should instead focus on whether the speech limited somehow falls within
the concept of "speech" to be protected as intended by the original Framers. For example,
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Court found that the Ohio statute touched the core of the First
Amendment" because the amendment "affords the broadest
protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.' "" "No form of speech," the
Court concluded, 82"is entitled to greater constitutional protection than
Mrs. McIntyre's.
Secondly, having determined that anonymous political speech is
indeed within the realm of First Amendment protections, the Court

in McIntyre Justice Thomas contended that the question of whether anonymous candidateor issue-related speech is protected under the First Amendment should be analyzed solely
through a strict review of the Framers' intent, unless that assessment of "the original
understanding" cannot provide the answer. 115 S. Ct. at 1530 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment). Like the analysis employed by the majority, such a narrow approach is also
fraught with difficulty, see, e.g., id.at 1532-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Framers did not clearly intend to include anonymous election speech within the protective
realm of the First Amendment, but that such speech is at its periphery), and is subject to
debate, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
80. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518.
81. I& at 1518-19 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam)
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
82. I& at 1519. The Court has recognized the proposition that "government may
adopt reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, which do not discriminate among
speakers or ideas, in order to further an important governmental interest unrelated to the
restriction of communication." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (per curiam). In
other words, some restrictions, such as prior restraints, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 450-52 (1938) (striking down city ordinance requiring people to obtain permission
before distributing handbills), complete prohibitions on a given form of speech, City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S.Ct. 2038,2045 (1994) (striking down city ordinance banning signs
as a complete and thus unconstitutional foreclosure of a medium of expression), and
restrictions on the content of speech, McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1518, are presumptively
unconstitutional unless there is an overriding state interest and the regulation speaking to
that interest is not overbroad. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1519-22; cf.Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 212-13 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (contending that a content-based
restriction not grounded in the protection of another constitutionally guaranteed right,
such as the right to vote, cannot override the right to free speech); id at 217 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that polling-place restrictions are content-based restrictions and that
Tennessee did not show an overriding state interest justifying their use). Although a
daunting standard, it is by no means unheard of for the Court to permit certain
proscriptions on speech to stand. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 196-97, 210-11 (plurality
opinion) (holding that place-of-voting restrictions are not "content-neutral" because they
affect political speech only, but are still constitutional because of an overriding state
interest); id. at 214-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (maintaining that a
restriction on speech, though content-based, may still be constitutional if it is a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral regulation-of a nonpublic forum); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
626 (1954) (concluding that the side effect of self-censorship was not sufficient to strike
down lobbyist disclosure act); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288,314-16 (1913)
(finding that the required disclosure of editors' identities is an incidental, acceptable
burden resulting from regulation of use of the postal system).
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then considered whether the state had some overriding interest in
need of advancement and, concurrently, whether the state had
sufficiently tailored its regulation so that it would restrict speech only
to the point necessary to safeguard that overriding interest. This is
the "exacting scrutiny" test applied by the Court since NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson and discussed at some length in McIntyre.8

In applying exacting scrutiny to the Ohio statute, the Court
responded directly to the Ohio Supreme Court's findings that the
statute served two important and legitimate state interests: providing
the electorate with relevant information and preventing fraudulent
and libelous statements.' As to the first, the Court was brief to the
point of being dismissive, expending just a single paragraph of text
with a single citation.85 When the author of a handbill is unknown
to the handbill recipients, stated the Court, disclosing the author's
identity does not necessarily enhance "the reader's ability to evaluate
the document's message."86 Thus, the Court concluded, "Ohio's
informational interest is plainly insufficient to support the
constitutionality of its disclosure requirement. '

83. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1518-22; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text
(discussing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and the "exacting
scrutiny" test).
84. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519.
85. Id. at 1519-20 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974)). Miami Herald arguably was not even on point; it stood more precisely for the
proposition that a newspaper could not be forced to publish replies by a candidate the
paper had criticized, as opposed to the more general proposition that a writer could not
be forced to "make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit." Id. Requiring
a speaker to "put forward the best arguments against himself" is not quite the same thing
as requiring a speaker to identify himself. See id. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1520. The Court also conceded in a footnote that "the identity of the source
is helpful in evaluating ideas. But 'the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.'" Id. at 1519-20 n.11 (quoting New York
v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
The continued vitality of Justice Holmes's "market-place of ideas" metaphor is not
universally accepted. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 119 (rejecting Justice Holmes's
conception of free speech as "a conception that disserves the aspirations of those who
wrote America's founding document").
87. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520. Such a quick dismissal of the informational value of
disclosure for the electorate was not forecast by commentators. For example, Professor
Tribe, writing before McIntyre, noted that a state's interest in providing voters with
information needed to better assess campaign literature, one of the major purposes that
disclosure laws advance, is not readily protected by other means. TRIBE, supra note 29,
at 1132, see also James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral
Outcomes: A Challengeto FirstAmendment Doctrine,51 U. CH. L. REV. 892,897 (1984)
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In contrast, the Court agreed that Ohio's asserted interest in
preventing fraud and libel is of special concern during election
campaigns, when false statements may have serious adverse consequences for the electoral process.8 Even so, the Court noted that
Ohio did not rely solely on its anonymous leafletting ban to prevent
fraud, but in fact held in place detailed laws specifically prohibiting
false statements during political campaigns. 89 Thus, the Court stated,

Ohio's ban on anonymous leafletting was not its principal weapon
against fraud, but rather was an aid to the enforcement of its specific
prohibitions. 0
Moreover, the Court found that the statute was not sufficiently
tailored because its broad scope applied, in addition to fraudulent and
libelous statements, equally to "individuals acting independently"
using their own resources, to "ballot issues that present neither a
substantial risk of libel nor any potential appearance of corrupt
advantage," to leaflets delivered both days and months before an
election, and "no matter what the character or strength of the
author's interest in anonymity.'

The Court concluded that "Ohio

ha[d] shown scant cause for inhibiting the leafletting at issue here,"
such that its statute could not survive exacting scrutiny.92 To drive
home his point, Justice Stevens ended his opinion by declaring that
"[o]ne would be hard pressed to think of a better example of the
pitfalls of Ohio's blunderbuss approach than the facts of the case
before us."93
In sum, speaking for a majority of six justices, Justice Stevens
first concluded that anonymous political speech was, presumptively,
protected speech. He then applied exacting scrutiny to Ohio's ban on
such speech to conclude that, despite addressing a valid interest in
safeguarding the electoral process from fraud and libel, the statute
was unconstitutional for overbreadth.
(arguing that one condition necessary to ensure that electoral outcomes are accurate and
rational-reflecting a true, reasoned, and informed choice of the people-is that accurate,
relevant information must be available to the voters).
88. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520.
89. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.09.1(B), 3599.09.2(B) (Anderson 1988)).
90. Id. at 1521.
91. Id- at 1521-22. See King, supra note 39, at 152-67, written shortly before McIntyre
was handed down, for a thorough analysis of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision and the
reasoning it used in finding that the statute at issue was not overbroad and that it was
sufficiently tailored to meet legitimate state interests. King also considers the potential
constitutional viability of more narrowly crafted "campaign falsity statutes." Id. at 155-56.
92. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522, 1524.
93. Id. at 1524.
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Justice Scalia, in his dissent, took a somewhat different tack.
First, in deciding whether anonymous political speech was within the
realm of protected speech under the First Amendment, he chose to
consider the historical record and Framers' intent, as had Justice
Thomas.94 Unlike Justice Thomas, however, he asserted that "to
prove that anonymous electioneering was used frequently is not to
establish that it is a constitutional right."" He concluded that, given
the weakness of the historical record, constitutional protection had
not been afforded to anonymous election speech because of another
indication "of the most weighty sort: the widespread and longstanding traditions of our people."96 Stating that such long-established
tradition by itself decided the case for him, Justice Scalia then
declared that even if he were to ignore such tradition and analyze
only the case law, he still would have upheld Ohio's proscription of
anonymous speech. 7 In reaching this conclusion, he applied a
balancing analysis similar to that required by the majority's exacting
scrutiny test, albeit with slightly reformulated questions.
The first two questions Justice Scalia posed were "whether
protection of the election process justifies limitations upon speech that
cannot constitutionally be imposed generally," and "whether a 'right
to anonymity' is such a prominent value in our constitutional system
that even protection of the electoral process cannot be purchased at
its expense."9 " These questions amount to a somewhat convoluted
way of asking simply which one trumps-protection of the electoral
process or protection of anonymous free speech. Finding support in
case law, Justice Scalia concluded that no justification for regulation
is more compelling than protection of the electoral process, and even
though "[s]everal of our cases have held that in peculiarcircumstances
the compelled disclosure of a person's identity would unconstitutionally deter the exercise of First Amendment associational rights ...
[t]hose cases did not acknowledge any general right to anonymity."99
Contending that "[a]nonymity can still be enjoyed by those who
require it, without utterly destroying useful disclosure laws," Justice
Scalia noted that the record in McIntyre contained no indication that
Mrs. McIntyre feared threats, harassment, or reprisals-circumstances
94. See supranotes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's opinion
concurring in the judgment).
95. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Ild. at 1532 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1534 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Finding no
previously engendering the Court's protection.3°
peculiar circumstances here, his third and final question in considering
the issue at hand was "whether the prohibition of anonymous
campaigning is effective in protecting and enhancing democratic elections."'01 At this point, Justice Scalia argued that the Court should
have deferred to the judgment of state and federal elected politicians

-as

well as the legislative officials of a number of foreign

democracies-all of whom had seen the need to enact such

statutes."° He concluded by arguing that the states do in fact have
valid interests-in providing information to the electorate and

preventing fraud and libel-that clearly outweigh any interest in
anonymity, especially given the recent increase in mudslinging "by
political candidates and their supporters to the detriment of the
democratic process.""
In contrast to the concurrence, therefore, Justice Scalia applied

a somewhat different legal analysis.

He first adopted Justice

Thomas's approach of determining the Framers' intent regarding

100. Id. at 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 57 (discussing the Court's
assessment of these circumstances in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson).
101. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 1535-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting). With regard to the regulation of political
campaign speech specifically, Professor Tribe notes:
The fear that a prevailing government might some day wield its power over
political campaigns so as to perpetuate its rule generates a commendable
reluctance to invest government with broad control over the conduct of political
campaigns. Nonetheless, the countervailing concern that completely unregulated
political campaigns would degenerate in such a way that the electorate would be
divested of its power to make a reasoned choice among the candidates has
persuaded state legislatures to enact and courts to uphold some restrictions on
campaign practices.
TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1129-30. For more discussion of electoral process distortions
caused by negative attacks against political candidates, see Jack Winsbro, Comment,
Misrepresentationin PoliticalAdvertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J.
853, 864 (1987) (considering whether and how states can permissibly regulate political
advertising to ensure that electoral results are "rational... and reflect the true, reasoned,
and informed choice of the people") (citation omitted). See also Peter F. May, Note, State
Regulation of PoliticalBroadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive Negative
Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REv. 179, 179 (1992) ("Although deceptive attack advertisements may
successfully erode voter support for opposing candidates, they also threaten the electoral
process by diminishing substantive discussion of important campaign issues by discouraging
qualified candidates from seeking public office."); cf Lance Conn, Comment, Mississippi
Mudslinging: The Searchfor Truth in PoliticalAdvertising, 63 MISS. L.J. 507, 507, 520-21
(1994) (evaluating the problem of "mudslinging, smears, and outright lies" in Mississippi
electoral politics, and Mississippi's state code prohibiting anonymous publishing to address
that problem, and concluding that the statute would not survive constitutional scrutiny by
a Mississippi court).
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anonymity, but rejected Justice Thomas's conclusions. He then
applied his own three-part test regarding the value of anonymity in
the context of the electoral process, responding directly to the
majority's use of exacting scrutiny. In doing so, Justice Scalia reached
a conclusion opposite that of the majority. Viewed broadly, in other
words, Justice Scalia performed essentially the same balancing
exercise as had the majority, weighing Ohio's interests in regulating
the electoral process against Mrs. McIntyre's interests in remaining
anonymous, but used a different legal analysis and, in doing so,
reached a different conclusion.
Despite his refusal to recognize Justice Scalia's reformulated
analysis in place of the Court's traditional exacting scrutiny test,
Justice Stevens in his majority opinion offered few clues as to what
would constitute an acceptably tailored proscription, and he certainly
did not provide a definitive answer." To confuse things further,
the majority left the following loophole: "We recognize that a State's
[electoral process protection] interest might justify a more limited
identification requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for
inhibiting the leafletting at issue here."' 5 Or, as repeated by Justice
Ginsburg in her concurrence, "We do not.., hold that the State may
the speaker to disclose its
not in other, larger circumstances, 0require
6
identity.'
its
disclosing
by
interest
Justice Scalia pounced on this "soothing" but "unhelpful"
proclamation:
104. The crux of the majority's assessment of whether Ohio's ban was narrowly tailored
enough to survive exacting scrutiny consisted of the following:
[T]he prohibition encompasses documents that are not even arguably false or
misleading. It applies not only to the activities of candidates and their organized
supporters, but also to individuals acting independently and using only their own
modest resources. It applies not only to elections of public officers, but also to
ballot issues that present neither a substantial risk of libel nor any potential appearance of corrupt advantage. It applies not only to leaflets distributed on the
eve of an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited, but also to those
distributed months in advance. It applies no matter what the character or

strength of the author's interest in anonymity.
McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1521-22. This analysis offers some hint as to what a sufficiently
tailored proscription on anonymity might look like. That is, by opposition to proscriptions

clearly repugnant to the majority, proscriptions on activities of candidates and their

organized supporters, elections of public officers, and leaflets distributed on the eve of an
election might survive exacting scrutiny. Given such brief mention, however, and to the
extent that considerable variation could be read into such regulations, the analysis provides
no real criteria that could be used to decide whether a given disclosure requirement was
sufficiently tailored.
105. Id. at 1522.
106. Id at 1524 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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573

Perhaps, then, not all the State statutes I have alluded to are
invalid, but just some of them; or indeed maybe all of them
remain valid in "larger circumstances"! It may take decades
to work out the shape of this newly expanded right-to-speakincognito, even in the elections field.'
Formulating a set of hypotheticals to show how a guaranteed right to
anonymity would disrupt other, non-election-related government
upon a
activities, he concluded that "[t]he silliness that 'follows
'
generalized right to anonymous speech has no end.210
This failure to delineate what would constitute a sufficiently
tailored proscription on anonymous speech, especially in light of the
open jurisprudential door left by the Court, justifies this assertion:
The legal analysis offered by McIntyre, taken by itself, does not
provide a satisfactory basis from which to predict confidently whether
a given proscription on anonymous political speech would survive the
overbreadth component of the Court's exacting scrutiny test.
Furthermore, given the essential similarities between the legal
analyses employed by the majority and dissent in McIntyre, and given
the obstinate state of ambiguity left by the majority as to what might
constitute a sufficiently tailored proscription on anonymous political
speech, all legal reasoning and policy debate considered,"° one is
still left with the problem of how to evaluate the decision in McIntyre
and its long-term consequences. One fruitful alternative is to look
beneath the legal and policy arguments, looking instead at the
normative concerns driving those arguments. 10 Stepping back from
107. Id. at 1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. For a brief discussion of the legal and policy arguments for and against disclosure
requirements proscribing anonymous speech generally, see HAIMAN, supra note 74, at 358-

60 (1981).
110. See supra note 7 (describing the framework and purpose of the normative analysis
employed for this Note). One observer asserts that at least five kinds of valid
constitutional arguments are generally recognized to support a judicial decision, including
those based on the constitutional text, the intent of the framers, constitutional theory,
judicial precedent, and normative or value arguments that assert claims about justice or
social policy. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of Constitutional

Interpretation,100 HARV. L. REV. 1189,1189-90 (1987). In situations where these different
categories of argument cannot be synthesized into a single, coherent constitutional calculus,
because the outcomes of applying the different arguments would differ, the categories are
typically assigned a hierarchical order in which the higher ranked factors, as listed above,
prevail over lower ranked factors as the basis for decision. Id. at 1193-94. In other words,
arguments based on the plain meaning of the constitutional text, for example, generally
prevail over arguments based on a postulation of the Framers' intent. But in "hard cases,"
i.e., where none of the arguments are clearly dispositive and no coherent synthesis of
arguments can be developed, the higher ranked factors are arguably least likely to prove
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the formal legal arguments, one may perceive two conflicting
normative concerns about the weakness of human nature, and one
overarching normative question about the attributes of human reason,
to be at the core of the debate over state proscriptions of anonymity.
It is helpful to consider these three questions initially in an abstract
way.
First is the question of how much we should worry about the
human tendency to use power to maintain power and, as an extension
of that concern, how vigorously we should protect the use of
anonymity as a shield from coercion and reprisal. Second is the
countervailing question of how much we should concern ourselves
with the human tendency to hide behind the shield of anonymity,
when it is afforded, in order to "sling mud." Finally, overlying these
two concerns is the question of how much faith can be put in the
"ordinary voter" to discern truth from mud and discount the sullying
effects of dirty tricks and character assassination.
Pursuing this inquiry, we can see that if a court has an abiding
fear of the tyranny of those in power, then it will likely be willing to
accept some amount of mudslinging, and perhaps even corruption in
the form of fraud and libel, to constrain that tyranny. Alternatively,
if a court has less fear of the state than it has fear of the power of
individuals to corrupt politics anonymously when given the chance,
then the threat of coercive harassment on the part of the state
becomes less important. Finally, a strong belief in the ability of the
voter to discern truth serves to further vitiate concerns with mudslinging, whereas a strong skepticism of such ability in the voter serves to
heighten concern with electoral corruption.
Applying this model to McIntyre, it can be argued that the
majority falls squarely within the first camp described. That is to say,
the majority holds steadfastly to the compelling belief that anonymous
pamphleteering "is a shield from the tyranny of the majority....
[and] exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an
persuasive or determinate, while the lower ranked factors, including normative, valuebased concerns, are likely to exert a very powerful influence in achieving a coherent basis
of decision. Id. at 1194. Thus, while the precise relevance of normative arguments in
judicial analysis may be highly situational, such arguments may sometimes be controlling.
The question of the efficacy of protecting anonymous political speech appears to be just
such a "hard case," to the extent that the arguments employed by the majority and
dissenting opinions, including arguments based on the constitutional text (or lack thereof),
the Framers' intent, and judicial precedent, produced sharply divergent results.
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intolerant society.""' One way to see this predisposition is to view
the opinion from a distance. Using relative length of discussion as a
proxy for importance, it is illuminating to note that Justice Stevens
dedicates a substantial portion of his opinion to explicating the
practice and need for anonymous literary and political speech
generally, and election-related speech particularly." 2 He then
devotes even more textual discussion to debunking Ohio's arguments
that it had an overriding interest in protecting the electoral process
and that it had successfully tailored its anonymous speech ban to do
so."' At the same time, he expressed a faith in the ability of the
"common man" to discern truth in the jumbled "market-place of
4
ideas.""M

More specifically, the majority asserted that anonymous criticism
has been the only manner in which some oppressed groups could
criticize public laws and practice."' The Court emphasized that the
"speech in which Mrs. McIntyre engaged-handing out leaflets in the
advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint-is the essence of
First Amendment expression, ' and that while "the right to remain
anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct ...
political speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable

111. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524 (citing John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY
AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNmENT 1, 3-4 (R.B. McCallum ed.,
1947)).
112. ld. at 1516-19.
113. Id. at 1519-24.
114. See, e.g., id. at 1519-20 n.11. In this footnote, Justice Stevens quoted portions of
an opinion written by Judge Roberts in a New York case decided after Talley, but before
McIntyre, in which the judge struck down a New York statute proscribing anonymous
speech based on the Talley decision. In his decision, Judge Roberts, in part quoting Justice
Holmes, wrote:
Of course, the identity of the source is helpful in evaluating ideas. But "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market" (citation omitted). Don't underestimate the common man.
People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing.
They can see it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. "Tey can evaluate
the anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must
be, to read that message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to
decide what is "reasonable," what is valuable, and what is truth.
New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974); see also Redish & Lippman, supra
note 36, at 273 (asserting that as a "baseline" of free speech theory "the first amendment
both reflects and implements a belief in the ability of individuals to judge for themselves
the wisdom or persuasiveness of expressed viewpoints").
115. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516.
116. Id. at 1519.
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to
consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater weight
' n7
the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse."
Clearly, the Court has an overriding concern with the tyrannical
evils that may take control of those in power. And to establish the
critical link between that fear of majoritarian tyranny and the Court's
perception of the need to ensure a right of anonymity to check that
tyranny, Justice Stevens quoted a well-worn statement by Justice
Black drawn from Talley: " '[P]ersecuted groups and sects from time
to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive
practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.' 118
In contrast to the majority, Justice Scalia clearly perceives much
less of a need for anonymity, especially in the face of the potential for
corruption of the electoral process and the interest of the state in
safeguarding that process. "The law at issue here ...forbids the
expression of no idea, but merely requires identification of the
speaker when the idea is uttered in the electoral context. It is at the
periphery of the First Amendment...." 1 9 Justice Scalia found "no
reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more honorable, as a general
'
matter, than an anonymous phone call or an anonymous letter. 12
At the same time, however, he appears convinced that "the usefulness
of a signing requirement lies not only in promoting observance of
[Ohio's] law against campaign falsehoods ....[but] also in promoting
a civil and dignified level of campaign debate-which the State has no
power to command, but ample power to encourage by such undemanding measures as a signature requirement."''
Finally, although
decrying the increased potential for campaign mudslinging and "dirty
tricks" that a shield of anonymity will foster," Scalia failed to
respond to the majority's reliance on the voter's ability to "decide
what is 'responsible,' what is valuable, and what is truth."2 3
Viewed in the context of these normative questions, the crux of
the debate between the majority and the dissent in McIntyre becomes
more discernable as an underlying conflict between the majority's fear
of the tyranny of the powerful and the dissent's fear of electoral

117. Id. at 1524 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
118. Id. at 1516 (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)).
119. Id. at 1534 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
122. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1519 n.11 (citing New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978,
996 (1974)).
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distortions. 24 More importantly, however, this assessment of
McIntyre is also useful as a stepping stone toward a more precise
characterization of the role that anonymity plays in our political
society, as revealed by the Court's decision in McIntyre and the case
law underlying that decision. This more precise understanding then
supplies the explanatory piece that is missing when one looks only at
the various legal arguments employed in the decision. And this more
complete characterization, in turn, suggests a sturdier prediction
regarding the course of future adjudication of First Amendment
protections over anonymity, or conversely the likelihood that other
state proscriptions on anonymous political speech will survive exacting
scrutiny.
This assertion can be best elucidated and tested by reconsidering
the case law underlying McIntyre. Because it is more difficult to
demonstrate the operation of an important decisional factor, such as
the fear of unchecked tyranny, in cases where that factor was not
dispositive, consider first the line of decisions allowing proscriptions
on anonymity.
Specifically, in Lewis Publishingthe Court held that a federal law
requiring newspapers to disclose employees' identities and to identify
paid-for advertisements as such was incidental to a validly-exercised
control on the use of postal privileges and was not prohibited by the
First Amendment."' The appellants in Lewis argued that the law
in question, "thinly disguised as a regulation of the mails," was in fact
an exertion of legislative power that unduly restricted the freedom of
the press." Such a restriction, appellants maintained, was contrary
to the First Amendment's purpose of preventing censorship "either
by anticipation through a licensing system or retrospectively by
punishment."' ' The Court rejected this reasoning, finding instead

124. This conflict between the fear of a tyrannical government and the countervailing
fear that completely unregulated political speech would deteriorate and thus deprive the
electorate of its power to make reasoned decisions has been long recognized. See TRIBE,
supra note 29, at 1129-30. Until McIntyre, however, the precise role that anonymity plays
in checking tyrannical power, especially when anonymity is placed directly at odds with
state efforts to regulate political speech, has not been thoroughly explored by the Court
or by commentators. Professor Tribe in his treatise on constitutional law, for example,
discusses this issue only briefly and in a general way, relying on a single Supreme Court
decision, that decision being Talley. Id. at 1132 n.17.
125. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 314-16 (1913); see also supra notes
45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the McIntyre Court's treatment of Lewis
Publishing).
126. Lewis Publishing,229 U.S. at 299.
127. Id at 292.
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that the provision operated only to regulate second-class mail and that
failure to provide the required disclosures did not lead to a punitive
exclusion from use of the mail but merely exclusion from the right to
enjoy second-class postal rate privileges."2
More importantly, the Lewis Publishing Court expressly stated
that it saw no effort to regulate what should be published in
newspapers, and that its decision should not be understood as an
assent to the appellant's broad contentions concerning arbitrary
governmental power exercised through classification of the mails. 29
In other words, the Court saw in the disclosure requirement no
underlying motive by the government to coerce speech or expose
dissenting speech to reprisal. On the other hand, the Court recognized the disclosure requirement as a valid means of informing the
public of the actual owners of publications, and of enabling the public
to determine whether published material was actually in substance a
paid advertisement. 3 ' That is, the Court recognized the need for
disclosure in this case as an appropriate correction for potential
distortions in the political dialogue caused by misleading representations. This decision is consistent with the normative concerns
underlying McIntyre in that, absent a fear of tyrannical power and a
corresponding need for anonymity, the Lewis Publishing Court was
willing to allow a limited proscription on anonymity."'
Whereas Lewis Publishing addressed the acceptability of
disclosure requirements as applied to newspaper publishers in
exchange for preferred postal rates, Buckley 3 ' addressed disclosure
requirements pertaining to the receipt and expenditure of money for
In
the purpose of influencing candidates or elected officials.'
Buckley the Court upheld as constitutional a federal law requiring
that candidates, certain political committees, and individuals disclose
These particular
campaign contributions and expenditures.TM
requirements had not been challenged as being unconstitutional per
128. Id at 308.
129. ld. at 316.
130. 1d at 315-16.
131. Justice Scalia's assertion that Lewis Publishing represented the Court's longstanding rejection of "a generalized right of anonymity in speech," McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at
1535 (Scalia, J., dissenting), was correct to the extent that a form of disclosure had been
allowed, but he failed to acknowledge the normative concerns underlying both the Lewis
Publishing decision and the majority's opinion in McIntyre.
132. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
133. Id.at 12-13.
134. I& at 60-67; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Buckley
decision).
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se, but rather as unconstitutionally broad in their application.'35
Specifically, appellants contested the statute's reach to minor-party
and independent candidates, "contributions as small as $11 or $101,"
36
and those who make independent contributions and expenditures.
The Buckley Court conceded that it had "repeatedly found that
compelled disclosure, in itsel, can seriously infringe" on First
Amendment rights of association and belief. 37 After that assurance,
however, the Court applied exacting scrutiny to the requirements and
concluded that those requirements rested upon three compelling
interests: first, providing the electorate with information on the
sources and expenditures of political campaign contributions; second,
deterring actual corruption and the appearance of corruption by the
exposure of large contributions to the "light of publicity"; and third,
the data necessary to
providing an "essential means of gathering 138
detect violations of contribution limitations.',
The Buckley Court, having found these interests to be compelling, then focussed its attention on appellant's contention that such
disclosure requirements could pose substantial burdens on individual
rights and potentially even expose minor-party and independentcandidate contributors to harassment or retaliation. 39 Through this
assessment, the Court determined that the record provided by
appellants regarding the threat of harassment to such contributors"'
was "highly speculative" and showed no potential for a "serious
Although not
infringement" on First Amendment rights.' 4'
expressly addressing the threat of retaliation, the Court construed the
statute in question narrowly and concluded that the burden of the

135. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-61.
136. Md at 61. Chief Justice Burger saw the appellant's concern regarding very small
contributions to be persuasive; see supra note 50.
137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
138. Id.at 66-68.
139. Id. at 68.
140. The record consisted at best bf the "testimony of several minor-party officials that
one or two persons refused to make contributions because of the possibility of disclosure."
I& at 71-72.
141. Id. at 69-70. The Court specifically compared appellant's alleged threat of
harassment and reprisal from these contribution disclosure requirements against the
NAACP's " 'uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of
its rank-and-file members [had] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility' " in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,icL (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)) (alteration in the original), in which the Court had struck down
a state statute requiring membership disclosure for being an unconstitutional infringement
on the right of association; see supra note 57 (discussing the Pattersondecision).
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requirements reaching even those making small contributions did not
amount to an unacceptable restraint on speech. 42 Thus, as with
Lewis Publishing,this decision also is consistent with the normative
model found in McIntyre in that, absent a clear showing of the threat
of coercion and retaliation, and absent a corresponding need for
anonymity, the Buckley Court was willing to allow limited proscriptions on anonymity.
In the more recent case of Burson v. Freeman,4" which spoke
directly to the conflict between the right of free speech and a state
prohibition on speech-anonymous or not-near voting places, the
Court upheld a Tennessee statute as a requirement appropriately
designed to achieve the state's interest in providing a voting environment free from intimidation and fraud.'
The Court specifically
found that the statute's "minor geographical limitation" did not
constitute a "significant impingement" on speech. 5
The Burson decision is somewhat confounding to the extent that
Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in McIntyre,
dissented in Burson while Justice Scalia, the author of the dissent in
McIntyre, concurred in the judgment in Burson. The essential
elements of Justice Scalia's concurrence in Burson-that established
state tradition should prevail and that the plurality's categorization of
the state's regulation was incorrect'46-are entirely consistent with
his concerns raised in dissent in McIntyre, in which he asserted that
established state tradition should prevail and that the majority's
assessment of the value of anonymous speech was incorrect. 47
Similarly, the essential elements of Justice Steven's dissent in
Burson-that the Court's analysis deferring to established state
tradition was "deeply flawed"'" and that the minor nuisance of
campaign "hubbub" outside a polling place was not a sufficient reason
to insulate voters from election-day campaigning and suppress a

142. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74-82.
143. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion).
144. Id at 211 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text
(discussing the Burson decision).
145. Burson, 540 U.S. at 210 (plurality opinion).

146. See id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Specifically, Justice Scalia
differed with the plurality's conclusion that the Tennessee law was a facially content-based

restriction on political speech in a public forum, asserting instead that the statute was a
"reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a nonpublic forum." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
147. See McIntyre, 115 S.Ct. at 1532-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Burson, 504 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"substantial amount of protected political expression"4--were
entirely consistent with both his conclusion in McIntyre that
anonymity is necessary to ensure unfettered political speech 50 and
with his failure
to address Justice Scalia's "legislative traditions"
5
argument.1 1
Viewing the contending concerns of Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens across these two decisions from this perspective, and bearing
in mind that Tennessee's law was a narrowly crafted restraint on all
speech-not just anonymous political speech-in areas immediately
surrounding voting places, the Burson decision can also be seen as
consistent with the normative model found in McIntyre. That is, in
the absence of a clear threat of majoritarian tyranny and a corresponding need for anonymity to check that tyranny, despite Justice
Stevens' individual conclusion otherwise, the Burson Court was willing
to accept as constitutional Tennessee's proscription on political speech
at polling places.
In contrast to the chore of divining the role of anonymity in
Lewis Publishing, Buckley, and Burson, its operation in Lovell,"
Bellotti,5 ' Patterson," and Talley' 5 -all of which struck down
proscriptions on speech-is more transparent. In Lovell, for example,
the Court struck down a local ordinance requiring that any person
distributing handbills obtain permission to do so first because it was
a law aimed "at the very foundation of the freedom of the press."' 56
The Court concluded that legislation such as the ordinance in question
was unacceptable because it "would
restore the system of license and
17
censorship in its baldest form."'
Similarly, in Bellotti the Court found that a state law prohibiting
corporate expenditures designed to influence income-tax referenda-anonymous or not-was unconstitutional because the inherent

149. IL at 227-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524.
151. See supranotes 101-3 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's treatment
of state legislative tradition in McIntyre).
152. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); see supranotes 55-57 and accompanying text
(discussing the Lovell decision).
153. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see supra notes 58-62
and accompanying text (discussing Bellotti).
154. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see supra note 57
(discussing the Pattersondecision).
155. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); see supra notes 63-74 and accompanying
text (discussing Talley).
156. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 450-53.
157. Id. at 452.
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capacity of speech to inform the public does not depend on the
identity of its source. 5
The consistency of this decision with
McIntyre is visible in the Bellotti Court's emphasis on the" 'universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs' ,159 and that the
First Amendment embraces " 'the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment. ... [and] all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' ""6 Thus, while
Bellotti does not address directly the question of anonymity, it
trumpets, as does McIntyre, the Court's abiding belief in the sanctity
of unfettered political speech in our society.
Finally, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and Talley v.
California, the Court expressly based its decisions on the fear of
coercion and reprisal. Specifically, in Pattersonthe Court struck down
an Alabama disclosure law because it potentially subjected the
NAACP's members to threats, harassment, or reprisal. 6 ' Similarly,
in Talley the Court struck down a Los Angeles city ordinance
requiring disclosure of the author's identity on any handbill because
"anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive
purpose" and because the disclosure Los Angeles required, and the
fear of reprisal such identification would engender, "might deter
perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance."' 62
In conclusion, careful review of this sampling of the case law
underlying McIntyre, including both those decisions in which proscriptions on anonymity were allowed and the contrary decisions in which
they were not, soundly supports the assertions made in this Note
regarding the import of McIntyre. First, it has been the Court's
underlying normative fear of tyrannical power and the perceived need
to safeguard anonymity as a check on that power, rather than debates
over methodologies of constitutional interpretation or larger questions
of legislative versus judicial policy-making authority, that appear to
have consistently driven the Court's decisional calculus whenever a
federal or state disclosure law raised the specter of tyranny.
158. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771-77 (1978).
159. itL
at 776-77 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)) (alteration in
original).
160. Id.at 776 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)).
161. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,466 (1958); see also supra note
57 (discussing Patterson).
162. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
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Second, McIntyre also suggests that whenever the Court perceives
that a federal or state law raises the specter of tyrannical power, then
it will jealously safeguard the right to anonymity as a check against
such tyranny by striking the law down, even though it may recognize
that the state may have had a compelling reason for enacting that
law." Conversely, given the Court's treatment of prior cases that
have upheld federal and state disclosure requirements, 164 McIntyre
suggests that only when the Court perceives that a given law does not
compromise the role of anonymity in protecting a society member's
entrance to the political dialogue, will it be willing to allow some
proscription of anonymity in the name of correcting distortions of that
dialogue.
Finally, with this more precise characterization of the role of
anonymity in the political dialogue process, a sturdier prediction
unfolds regarding the course of future adjudication of questions
concerning anonymity, or in other words the likelihood that other
state proscriptions on anonymous political speech will survive exacting
scrutiny.65 That prediction is that the Court will almost certainly
invalidate any challenged government proscription on the right to
conduct political speech anonymously when any discernable and real
potential exists for those in power to use disclosure of the author's
identity to harass or coerce. This will be true regardless of whether
the government restriction is a federal, state, or local regulation or
whether the threatening powers arise from government itself or from
other members of society. Viewed another way, the key implication
for practitioners litigating any of the many state disclosure statutes
cited by Justice Scalia in his dissent is that arguments speaking clearly
to the threat of coercion and reprisal, and the need for anonymity to
guard against such tyranny, will ring most true with the Court."6

163. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520-21 (finding that Ohio's interest in regulating false
and libelous statements through a ban on anonymous political leafletting was a valid
interest before striking down the regulation as overbroad).
164. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (describing selected decisions, cited
to but distinguished from McIntyre by the majority, in which disclosure requirements were
upheld).
165. The Court will almost certainly apply strict scrutiny to any future restrictions on
political speech. This outcome can be foretold because six current Justices of the Court,
supported by much of McIntyre's underlying case law, see the issue thus, and because the
seventh member of the concurrence, Justice Thomas, has been satisfied as to the Framers'
intent.
166. A good test of this prediction could well unfold here in North Carolina given the
North Carolina Supreme Court's 1993 decision in State v. Petersile,334 N.C. 169, 432
S.E.2d 832 (1993). This decision construed a North Carolina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT.
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Ultimately, only time will tell the breadth of McIntyre's sweep.
But the view from here suggests that the Court has in effect recognized a right to remain anonymous when engaging in electoral and
other political speech, and that the sweep of the Court's decision
could be nearly as broad and deep as Justice Scalia portends. In
other words, at least insofar as anonymous leafletting and similar
political speech goes, the Court really did buy "in for a cow," Justice
Ginsburg's assurances notwithstanding.
RICHARD

K. NORTON

§ 163-274(7) (1991), which is very similar to the Ohio statute struck down in McIntyre.
For a thorough summary and assessment of this decision, written before McIntyre was
handed down, see Steven Robert Daniels, Recent Case, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1618 (1994).
Based on Daniels's analysis, a good argument can be made that Petersilie will not
remain good law in North Carolina if challenged, whether it is taken to the United States
Supreme Court or to the North Carolina Supreme Court, for two reasons. First, this North
Carolina statute, by its operation with several other campaign-related statutes, may well
in practice end up applying only to "those who publish-in quantities small enough to
evade the reporting requirements [of the second disclosure statute]-true, but derogatory,
statements about a candidate." Id. at 1629 (emphasis added). If that argument holds,
then the statute almost certainly exceeds the limits of acceptable state proscriptions of
anonymous speech as established by McIntyre.
Second, the majority and dissenting opinions in Petersilie bear a strong resemblance
to those filed by the majority and dissent in McIntyre, only reverse. That is, Chief Justice
Exum's majority opinion in Petersilie reads very much like Justice Scalia's dissent,
primarily in terms of both opinions' reliance upon other state statutory practice as well as
their emphasis on the state's interests in protecting the elections process. Conversely,
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in McIntyre reads very much like Justice Mitchell's
dissent in Petersilie,primarily in terms of the emphasis placed on the need to guarantee
anonymity as a check against tyranny. When considering this, and the fact that Chief
Justice Exum has since retired and been replaced by Chief Justice Mitchell, the viability
of Petersilieand North Carolina's proscription on anonymous political speech if challenged
is doubtful.

